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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARCE L. HINES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs.-
NILE W. HARBERTSON and 





STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of an automobile accident occurring 
on Hill Air Force Base, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The Court dismissed 
the action as to Defendant Seeley, and directed a verdict 
against Defendant Harbertson. The jury was instructed 
on damages only, and returned with a verdict in favor of 
Plaintiff in the sum of $9,000.00 General Damages and 
$618.14 Special Damages. After a Motion for a New 
Trial was filed and argued, the Court granted Remittitur 
in the amount of $1,000.00. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGH'11 ON APPEAL 
Defendant Harbertson seeks reversal of the J udg-
ment, and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF F AC'l18 
':Che automobile accident involved three cars, pro-
ceding north on Hickory Road, Hill Air Force Base, 
a two lane road. (T-10) It was daylight. Seeley, first 
in line, was a stranger to the base and was looking for 
his destination, when he observed a sign which stated 
"NO CIVILIAN VEHICLES BEYOND THIS POINT." 
(T-11) Seeley assumed the sign referred to Hickory 
Street traffic (which it did not) and stopped (T-11). 
His stop was in the lane of traffic, although there was 
ample room to his right to stop off the travel portion. 
(T-12) Plaintiff Hines was driving a Jeep behind Seeley. 
There was a dispute as to the manner in which the two 
vehicles ahead of Defendant Harbert son stopped, but 
Seeley testified that when he stopped he was not aware 
of any cars behind him. (T-12) Harbertson, following the 
Jeep, "May have" glanced to his right, but became aware 
of the Jeep stopping when he realized, 50 feet away, 
the distance was closing fast. (T-19) There were no 
brake lights on the Jeep, and no signal was given. (T-19) 
Harbertson jammed his brakes but collided with the rear 
of the Jeep, which struck the Seeley car. The accident, 
according to Seeley, occurred just after a turn in the 
road. (T-10) vVhile the cars were standing in the road 
following the accident, while the participants were out 
of their cars, a northbound car almost collided with him. 
(T-27) 
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11here was no intersection near the scene; the area 
was a warehouse area, with no pedestrians, as the shift 
had left overone-half hour before. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVlNG NO IN-
STRUCTION8 TO THE JURY ADVISING 
THEM OF THEIR DUTIES, DEFINING LE-
GAL TERMINOLOGY, OR FURNISHING 
GUIDE LINES FOR THEIR DELIBERA-
TIONS. 
In this case, the Honorable rl1rial Court literally told 
eight jurors to go out and assess damages, without in-
structing them at all. Two instructions were given on 
damages, one that six can find a verdict, and they were 
sent out to deliberate. 
The jury had no cautionary instructions to guide 
them, such as those contained in J.I.F.U. (1.1 - Duties 
of Judge and Jury; 1.5 - Sympathy, Prejudice, Passion; 
1.8 - Approach of Jurors to Deliberations; 1.13 - Re-
sort to Chance Forbidden; etc., or the "Standard" In-
structions to guide the jury defining Burden of Proof; 
Preponderance of the Evidence; Proximate Cause (which 
term was used in Instruction No. 1 but never defined). 
We anticipate Respondent's contention that Defend-
ant Harbertson never formally requested these instruc-
tions, and therefore cannot now complain. In the first 
place, the Honorable Trial Judge is a seasoned veteran 
before whom we have tried many junr cases. Never 
before had we found it necessary to f orrnally request 
him, or any other Judge, that he give the jury basic 
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necessary instructions concerning their duties and n•-
sponsibilities, and defining legal terms used in the in-
structions. Secondly, the record will support our efforh;, 
by exceptions taken immediately after the jury retin•d 
to deliberate, which gave the Court the opportunity to 
correct the error by recalling the jury for further in-
structions. 
In 63 Am . .Jur. Trial, Sec. 510, Pg. 412, the text 
states: 
"The law of e\'Pry case, in whatever form 
presented, belongs to the court; and in a jury trial 
it is not only the prerogative of the judge, but 
his solemn duty, to declare it, especially where 
requested so to do. A court has power to instruct 
the jury on all questions of law growing out of 
the facts of a cause being tried, without a request 
from either party, and it has been declared to be 
better practice for the court in all cases to give 
the jury a knowledge of the definitions and prin-
ciples of the law applicable. It is the rule in many 
jurisdictions that it is the duty of the court in 
civil cases to charge the jury on contested issues 
in the cause on trial irrespective of request by 
counsel for specific instructions. In carrying out 
this rule, the court should clearly and concisely 
define the issues as presented by the pleadings 
and the proof, and state the correct principles of 
law applicable thereto. In some jurisdictions the 
practice statutes and rules of practice impose an 
imperative duty upon the trial court to charge 
the jury. It is not to be inferred, however, that 
the trial court is bound upon its own initiative 
fully to charge the jury upon all facts and issues 
in this case; 'Under this ru.le it is the duty of the 
trial court to instritct the Jury on the basic funda-
nwntal rules applicable to the principal facts in 
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issue, and if its charge does not fully cover the 
facts and issues as counsel conceive them, it is 
the latter's duty to request instructions upon spe-
cific questions arising. In other jurisdictions it 
has been declared broadly that the court is not 
required to charge the jury on its own motion, 
when the parties negelct to request the court to 
give proper instructions, although it may be ques-
tioned whether, in most of the cases laying down 
this broad rule, the court did not have reference 
to the rule that objection cannot be taken to the 
omission of the trial court to charge upon par-
ticular issues ,or to the generality of the charge 
given, where counsel makes no effort to secure 
instructions submitting a particular point to the 
jury, or particularizing or making more definite 
the general charge to the jury. (Empasis added) 
This Honorable Court has heretofore recognized the 
above obligations on the part of the Trial Judge. 
In Sutton vs Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 
437 this Court stated: 
"It is contended that exceptions to the failure 
to give proper instructions are not available to 
Appellant because such instructions were not re-
quested ... 
If it is the duty of the Court to instruct the 
jury as to the law ·of the case, it is certainly its 
duty to give proper instructions. If it does not 
do so, and proper exceptions are taken, the error 
is available on appeal, unless it is harmless." 
In Hanks vs. Christensen, 11 Ut. 2d 8, 354 P2d 564, 
this Court states: 
"Nevertheless, it is the Judge who has the 
final responsibility for conducting the trial. He 
should be allowed considerable latitude and dis-
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cretion with _n·spe?t to the mechanics of pro-
cedure, and his rulmgs must be sustained unles8 
he has acted in some manner which is clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable and to the prejudice of 
the objecting party." 
In Johnson vs. CornwaU TVarchous<', 1G Ut. 2d lSG 
39f P2d 24, this Court states: 
"The object of jury instnwtiom; is to Pll-
lighten the jury on its problems." 
However, even if this Court should hold that attor-
neys may not assume that the Trial Court will give 
standard cautionary and definition instructions, and 
therefore must request them, this Honorable Court has 
the power given by Rule 51, U.R.C.P. to review the 
Trial Court's error, and grant a new trial. 
"No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto .... Notwithstanding the foregoing re-
quirement, the Appellate Court, in its discretion, 
and in the interests of justice, may review the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction." 
Requested Instructions were submitted by Counsel 
rn this case on the morning of the first day of trial. 
From this Defendant's Requested Instructions (R-13) it 
can at least be inferred by this Court that we were taken 
a bit by surprise when the Trial Court directed a verdict 
against Harbertson, and dismissed Seeley from the case, 
despite the fact that Seeley had admittedly broken the 
law and set up the chain of circumstances resulting in 
the accident. There was no time then to re-submit new 
,1,,-ritten instructions. 
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rrhis Court ha8 recognized this problem by the fol-
lowing language in Hanks vs Christensen (Supra, Pg. 
5) : 
"It is obvious that if he did not receive the 
requests until all of the evidence was in, he would 
be confronted with an almost insuperable task and 
that there would be undue delay requiring the 
jury to wait until the instructions could be pre-
pared. However, it must also be appreciated that 
counsel is faced with some difficulties, particularly 
where changes in issues, or aspects of the evi-
dence, occur during the trial. In order to cope 
with these problems adequately there must be some 
comity between the court and counsel. The latter 
must cooperate by submitting his requests as early 
as possible to aid the court in preparing the in-
tructions to be given, and the court must permit 
some latitude for counsel to subit an additional 
instruction or two at a later time if the trial has 
taken some unexpected turn that would justify 
doing so'." 
See also 53 Am. Jur. Trial, Sec. 514: 
"The rule that the absence of a request for 
an instruction precludes a party from subse-
quently availing himself of the error in subject 
to exceptions. Thus, under the rule in some juris-
dictions, with reference to matter that is funda-
niental and goes to the gist of the case, it is the 
duty of the court to give an instruction, whether 
or not it is requested." (emphasis ours) 
Again in Hanks vs. Christensen (Supra, Pg. 5) 
"The vital question is not when or how the 
objections are allowed to he. made, but 
the instructions are corrt•ct. \Vhat the party 1s 
entitled to is a presentation of the case to the 
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jury under instructions that clearly, concisely an<l 
accurately state the issues and the law applicable 
thereto so that the jury will imderstand it::; duties ... 
(emphasis ours) 
Before the jury returned with their verdict, and in 
fact within moments after they had retired to the jury 
room, we called the Court's error to his attention by our 
exceptions. No action was taken by the Court, and we 
can only assume, therefore, that even if written instruc-
tions had been requested, that they would not have been 
given. 
Because of the lack of any instructions required jn 
all cases to insure a fair trial to all litigants, this De-
fendant, Mr. Harbertson, did not have a fair trial, and 
he is entitled to a reversal of the Judgment, and a new 
trial. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECT-
ING A VERDICT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
HARBERTSON. 
"In (passing on a motion for a directed ver-
dict) all of the testimony and all reasonable in-
ferences flowing therefrom which tend to prove 
the (Appellant's) case must be accepted as true, 
and all conflicts and all evidence which tends to 
disprove it must be disregarded." 
Coer vs. Mayfair Markets, 19 Ut. 2d 339, 431 P2d 
566: 
also citing Boskovich vs. Utah Construction Com-
pany, 123 Ut. 387, 259 P2d, 885, and 
Holland vs. Brown, 15 Ut. 2d 422, 394 P2d 77, 10 
ALR 2d 449 
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rrhe evidence then, which the jury had a right to 
believe, was as follows : 
Defendant Seeley, driving north in the only lane for 
north-bound traffic, after seeing the sign, unlawfully 
in the traffic lane (contrary to 41-6-101 UCA 
1953) without a signal, (contrary to 41-6-69 ( c)), and in 
a place where there was ample room to stop off the 
roadway. (T-12) He stopped without knowing there were 
any cars behind (T:..12), and in a warehouse area where 
there was no intersection, no pedestrians, and no on-
coming traffic. Because of ample shoulders and flat 
areas off the road, there was no reason for following 
drivers to anticipate a car stopping in the lane of traffic. 
(Mr. Harbertson - T-23) 
The square-backed Jeep obscured this Defendant's 
view of the Seeley car, and when the Jeep slowed sud-
denly, there were no brake lights or other signals on 
Plaintiff's car to warn Mr. Harbertson. 
Under these facts, the jury questions were : 
1. Was the Plaintiff contributorily negligent for 
failing to have adequate brake lights as required by law, 
and if so, was that negligence a proximate cause of the 
2. Should Defendant Harbertson, as a reasonable 
and prudent motorist have then reasonably anticipated 
that the vehicles ahead would stop, and if so, was his 
negilgence a proximate cause of the 
3. Was the negligence of Seeley, whose illegal ac-
tions set the chain of circumstan('.es in motion, the sole, 
}H'oximate cause of the accident? 
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POINT THREg 
THE .JURY VERDICT vVAS EXCESSIVE. 
A. vVhere the jury was not instructed on defini-
tions of law, or cautioned on guide lines they 
must follow, their verdict must be assumed 
to be erroneous. 
88 C.J.S., rrrial, Sec. 2GG, Pg. 726: 
"The office or purpose of instructions is to 
inform the jury as to the law of the case applicahlP 
to the facts in such a manner that the jury may 
not be misled, and to furnish a guide to assist in 
reaching a verdict . . . in more general terms, 
it has been laid down that the purpose of instruc-
tions is to aid the jury clearly to comprehend 
case, and to reach a just conclusion, a right deci-
sion, or ... to arrive at a correct, fair, just or 
proper verdict ... " 
In Wellman vs. Nob.le 12 Ut. 2d 350, 366 P2d 701, 
this Honorable Court stated: 
"\Vhen the error assigned is the giving or 
failure to give instructions, the real inquiry 
should be were the issues of fact necessary to be 
determined, and the principals of law applicable 
thereto, correctly presented to the jury in a clear 
and understandable manner? That is the purpose 
of instructions . . . " 
The Honorable rrrial Court has found that the jury 
verdict was excessive as evidenced by his Order granting 
remittitur. Why he has concluded it was excessive only 
to the extent of $1,000.00 he has not divnlged. 
In the case at Lar, the Plaintiff incurred $91.00 in 
doctor's bills (Exhibit "A") and $35.00 in physical ther-
apy treatmPnts (Exhibit "B"). All of these treatments 
were concluded in June of 1968. 
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r:l1he diagnosis ( T-39) was 
" ... a rnusculoligamentory strain of the lum-
bar spine and cervical spine ... complicated by 
pre-existing degenerative joint disease, namely 
Osteoarthritis, and in addition he had a laceration 
of the right heel." 
rrhe jury verdict was $9,000.00 General Damages. 
It goes without saying, that the Defendant has been 
deprived of a fair trial by jury, for the simple reason 
that the jury was not given instructions or guide lines 
by the Court, and they therefore had no way of knowing 
how to "arrive at a correct, fair, just or proper verdict." 
A party's right to a jury trial is not satisfied where 
the jury trial is not properly conducted, the verdict ad-
mittedly is unfair, and the Judge's decision is substituted 
as a final judgment. 
The Appellant, therefore is entitled to a new and 
fair jury trial. 
Respectfully snbmitted, 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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